Supply Chain Guard

Version updated for https://github.com/homeofe/supply-chain-guard to version v5.26.3.

  • This action is used across all versions by 0 repositories.

Action Type

This is a Composite action.

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Action Summary

The GitHub Action supply-chain-guard is an open-source tool designed to scan project dependencies across various ecosystems (npm, PyPI, Cargo, Go, RubyGems, Composer, NuGet, Docker, Terraform, VS Code extensions, GitHub Actions and repositories) for malware, fake AI tool repos, account takeovers, and numerous security threats. It generates CycloneDX SBOMs and SLSA provenance to detect and correlate findings into attack-chain incidents, providing comprehensive supply chain security audits.

What’s Changed

[5.26.3] - 2026-08-15

Added

  • 250 package IOCs imported from the GitHub Advisory Database, 173 of them corroborated against OSV.dev. All npm. The window is dominated by a single bulk-publication event: GitHub backfilled 5,249 OpenSSF malicious-packages records into the advisory database on 2026-08-14, most of them carrying MAL-2025-* identifiers for packages npm removed long ago. The importer queues the live material first, so this batch is the still-installable part: a farm of single-version throwaway publishes (the *-poke* and *-tea name families) plus a set of version-pinned dependency-confusion lures.
  • Six atomic indicators for the Vellia / Guangnao / lodash-js npm malware cluster (August 2026), extracted by hand from the OpenSSF malicious-packages write-ups because advisory databases publish package coordinates and nothing else. Three C2 domains: hub[.]client-llm[.]com, the WebSocket command hub that @guangnao/agent-proxy reconstructs at runtime via XOR and base64 so it never appears as a plaintext string; analytics[.]baskirill-an[.]workers[.]dev, the rotatable pool and wallet config endpoint for the @lodash-js/lodash-js cryptojacker; and registrynpmjs[.]to, a lookalike of registry[.]npmjs[.]org that @polymarkets/clob-client-v2 uses to serve a trojanized inquirer tarball through a direct dependency URL. Three matching dead-drop paths, including the @velliajs/discord runtime allow-list. All are single-source (amazon-inspector), so the feed rows carry confidence 0.85 rather than 1.0.
  • Two malicious GitHub accounts behind @velliajs/discord: navaLinh, which hosts the unpinned private repository the package installs its sysframe dependency from, and Vellia-Elyvia, which hosts the remote kill-switch that gates the bot at runtime. Both are attacker-created rather than compromised victims. The api[.]github[.]com host itself is deliberately not listed, only the attacker’s repository path, so ordinary GitHub API usage is not flagged. The same discipline applies to the workers[.]dev apex, where only the attacker’s specific worker subdomain is listed.