Supply Chain Guard

Version updated for https://github.com/homeofe/supply-chain-guard to version v5.25.8.

  • This action is used across all versions by 0 repositories.

Action Type

This is a Composite action.

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Action Summary

The supply-chain-guard GitHub Action is an open-source tool that performs a comprehensive supply-chain security scan for various ecosystems including npm, PyPI, Cargo, Go, RubyGems, Composer, NuGet, Docker, Terraform, VS Code extensions, and GitHub repositories. It detects malware campaigns such as GlassWorm, Vidar/GhostSocks, and Shai-Hulud, as well as fake AI tool repos and account takeovers. The action generates CycloneDX SBOMs with real dependency inventories and SLSA provenance for each scan result.

What’s Changed

[5.25.8] - 2026-08-08

Added

  • Threat feed: 250 malicious-package IOCs imported from the GitHub Advisory Database with OSV.dev corroboration (2026-08-08 sweep, 230 npm and 20 PyPI). 4,498 advisories were fetched over 45 pages; the page cap was not hit and no --allow-truncated or --allow-backlog override was used. 49 mappable entries remain behind the --limit 250 cap, all of them drainable inside the --days 14 window, so the next scheduled run takes them. The batch continues the Tinkoff/T-Bank dolyame-ui-* / devplatform-* / delivery-ci-* / ded-pwa-* dependency-confusion wave (roughly 130 names at the 35.x internal version series), adds a @depup/* cluster that mimics upstream releases with a -depup.N version suffix, a PyPI single-character-typosquat set (pydanticc, flasq, idnna, fastapii), an AI-agent impersonation cluster (aclade-agent, agenthub-ai, mangomind-agent), and a web3 tooling cluster (hardhat-cap, hardhat-set, forge-gas-diff, gas-diff-core, @coralxyz/anchor).
  • IOC blocklist: second indicator wave for the ChainDrop npm worm (Microsoft and Datadog published the resolver internals after the initial 2026-08-04 write-ups). Added the two sibling C2 routers resolved from the same Ethereum contract, pypi-get[.]com and js-mirror[.]com, the earlier rotation target awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu, four SHA-256 hashes from the later re-obfuscation waves (the .vscode/tasks.json IDE persistence hook, a re-obfuscated stage-2 stealer, the zZ.bin loader, and the embedded GitHub Actions Runner.Worker memory dumper), and the two fixed marker names of the exfiltration repositories the worm creates under each victim account. Every hash was re-confirmed by exact-string search against an independent write-up before ingestion; a fifth hash from the same source could not be corroborated and was deliberately left out. The public Ethereum RPC providers the resolver calls are deliberately not ingested - they are shared infrastructure, and a negative test pins that.
  • IOC blocklist: two follow-up indicators for the Alibaba developer toolchain RAT from Corgea’s analysis - the live raw.githubusercontent[.]com config dead-drop path under the already-blocked attacker account, and node-data-utils@1.0.1, a nineteenth staging package neither the advisory databases nor the original write-up listed. Both are single-source and carry confidence 0.85. The package is version-pinned rather than blocked by name, and the raw.githubusercontent[.]com host is never listed on its own.

Security

  • Lockfile: nanoid 3.3.16 to 3.3.18, resolving GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8 (high). A development-only transitive dependency, reached through vitest -> vite -> postcss; the published package still has commander as its only runtime dependency, so no consumer was ever exposed. Included here because the newly published advisory turns the npm audit --audit-level=high CI gate red on every branch until the lockfile moves.