Supply Chain Guard

Version updated for https://github.com/homeofe/supply-chain-guard to version v5.6.0.

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What’s Changed

v5.6.0 (2026-07-03)

Install-time guard + GitLab-native output + registry hardening (both remaining roadmap bets)

Ships the last two strategic bets from the 2026-07 roadmap. A second 4-lens adversarial verification gate reviewed the diff and BLOCKED the first candidate with 5 confirmed findings, all fixed here (a real Windows RCE among them). 40 new tests (1120 total).

  • Install Guard (Bet 2): supply-chain-guard guard <npm|pnpm|yarn|bun> [args...] checks each package spec against the offline IOC feed + known-bad-version blocklist + typosquat heuristics BEFORE the package manager runs any lifecycle script; a hit blocks the install (exit 2). --force overrides with a loud warning, --dry-run never invokes the manager. The only install blocker whose entire blocklist is auditable in git history, offline, no account.
  • GitLab-native output (Bet 3, delivered on the v5.5.0 GHCR image): --format gitlab emits a GitLab Dependency Scanning report (schema 15.2.4) for artifacts:reports:dependency_scanning, so findings surface in the GitLab security UI. Suppressed findings are excluded (mirrors the SARIF path).
  • Registry hardening: the Open VSX download and every redirect hop are now constrained to an https host allowlist (open-vsx.org + its storage host); the /tmp -> os.tmpdir() migration is finished across npm/pypi scanners.
  • CI/infra: Docker base images pinned by sha256 digest (with a weekly dependabot docker ecosystem to refresh them); the Jenkins example uses npx; scan --no-history skips writing .scg-history/ (the pre-commit hook uses it so hooks never write state into consumer repos).

Fixed by the verification gate before release:

  • Windows command injection (critical) in the Install Guard: the cmd.exe argument escaping was single-pass, but the npm/pnpm/yarn/bun .cmd shims re-parse %*, so a crafted package token (x"&echo ...&") could execute arbitrary commands. Now double-escaped (cross-spawn doubleEscapeMetaChars), proven closed by the gate’s own PoC.
  • Install-verb bypasses: npm isntall (and the other documented typo-aliases), yarn global add, and a value-taking global flag before the verb (npm --prefix x install evil) all silently skipped scanning. Verb detection rewritten; flag values are no longer misread as package specs.
  • --format gitlab could emit a >255-char vulnerability name that fails the GitLab schema, making GitLab discard the whole report; names are now capped.